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The Evolution of EU Asylum Policy 
I. Introduction  
The Single European Act (SEA) began a process that has evolved into a 
truly borderless Europe for some years. While it is now much easier for 
citizens to move freely in this new area, it became necessary to find an 
effective way to keep third country nationals out. What had began as a 
patchwork of intergovernmental agreements has gradually evolved into a 
Europe-wide asylum acquis, recently culminating in a May 2004 
breakthrough where ministers forged the basis of a Europe-wide common 
asylum policy. The development of the asylum acquis, however, took place 
alongside a considerable shift in the perception of asylum seekers in 
Europe. Those who were once seen in the post-war era as victims and even 
heroes have now become largely a security problem on the same levels as 
illegal migrants. Since the 1970s, there has been a drive towards the 
politicization of all migrants as a challenge to the protection of national 
identity and welfare provisions. This view is an outgrowth of the efforts of, 
inter alia, police, customs agents, social movements, and radical parties of 
the right. This paper will trace the development of asylum policy with 
regard to the European integration process and its transformation from a 
national concern to a European one. An examination of the forces behind 
the current shape of EU asylum policy will then be discussed, followed by 
an examination of asylum policy transfer during enlargement and some 
recommendations.  
The reasons behind the negative characterization of asylum seekers in 
Europe today is a familiar one: money. The economic miracle that was the Ashkaan Rahimi 
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welfare state in Europe has lost much of its steam, and it has and still is 
facing a multitude of new challenges to its societal integration and political 
legitimacy. Challenges appear in the form of rising poverty, 
multiculturalism, economic globalization, and the return of racist and 
xenophobic movements. Immigration as a whole has become a perceived 
threat to economic, cultural, and labor market stability. Asylum seekers, as 
part of this immigration, are naturally linked to these problems in very 
direct ways. How has the Europeanization of asylum policy affected these 
views, views that historically have been largely contained in the national 
sphere? It is actually quite easy to trace the connection between the 
creation of the internal market and the tightening of external security. This 
vision of asylum as a security issue was very clear at Maastricht, where 
asylum policy was placed in the Third Pillar, Justice and Home Affairs. 
Even outside of basic external security concerns resulting from the 
abolition of borders, restrictions aimed towards asylum seekers underpins 
(an often indirect) habit of EU policies supporting what Jeff Huysmans 
calls “welfare chauvinism” and the idea of immigration as a potentially 
destabilizing and dangerous force in a relatively homogenous society.
1  
Looking at statistical trends in the past decade, it is easy to see why the EU 
needs a comprehensive and effective common asylum policy. Table 1 
(appendix) makes it clear that EU nations as a whole receive the majority 
of asylum applicants in the world. During the past decade, EU countries 
have received anywhere from about 60% to 75% of all the world’s asylum 
seekers. As far the asylum seeker’s country of origin is concerned, the 
former Republic of Yugoslavia tops a list that includes (in order) Romania, 
Turkey, Iraq, and Afghanistan (UNHCR, 2003). Furthermore, one can see 
some emerging trends in the past few years. The UK and Ireland as of late 
have been experiencing a boom in asylum seeker applications (as well as 
some of the largest per capita flows, see Table 3) due in large part to the 
large shadow economy that can relatively easily support migrants, 
especially in the UK. At any rate, as the largest group of recipient countries 
in the world, one would imagine that the EU logically would have a 
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cohesive asylum policy. While points of cohesion do exist, the history of 
the Europeanization of asylum policy has been one of uncoordinated 
attempts of a mostly restrictive nature. 
Two extreme frames can be distinguished when looking at the field of 
asylum and immigration policy: the humanitarian (or liberal) frame that 
treats asylum as a human rights issue and what Sandra Lavenex calls the 
realist frame that tends to focus more on internal security. The realist frame 
is a more state-centered frame, where border control remains a vital 
function of state sovereignty and cross-border movements in an 
increasingly porous EU. Whether they be asylum seekers or illegal 
immigrants, the migrant is a foreigner entering the country that must be 
controlled for security’s sake, and rightly so.  The humanitarian frame is 
entrenched in the norms of human rights, and focuses more on the rights of 
the individual crossing the border rather than the crossing itself and its 
repercussions.
2 Asylum seekers have a right to seek asylum and receive 
protection in this frame, whereas in the realist frame they are first a security 
concern. 
Of course, no state fully frames the asylum debate in either extreme; a 
middle path is usually followed with one frame usually nominally 
dominating the other. Having an asylum regime that is too liberal would 
likely undermine internal security, while too great of an emphasis on 
security would seriously undermine human rights concerns.  Having at least 
some sort of balance is ideal, as there is much to be said for efficiency as 
well as respect for rights. Unfortunately, the trend in the past 20-odd years 
in the EU has tended to be one of realism, resulting in a string of restrictive 
reforms in asylum policy at the European level.            
II. Moving Towards A Common Approach 
Coordination of asylum policy in the EU has gone through two rather 
distinct phases since the postwar era. The immediate post-war period and 
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the following two decades were marked by very liberal asylum policies and 
an adoption of the humanitarian frame in Europe. In the face of the 
looming threat of the Soviet Union and a devastated market badly in need 
of cheap labor, Western Europe became the preferred destination for many 
fleeing persecution behind the Iron Curtain. As the 1970s approached 
however, European economies began to show some signs of weakness. 
Member states soon entered into a series of intergovernmental agreements 
aimed at curbing migration (and by extension asylum seekers) and by the 
mid to late 1980s anti-immigrant parties were gaining popularity.
3 At the 
same time, members from the national interior ministries began to raise 
asylum and immigration matters on the European agenda together with 
issues like crime and drug trafficking. Member state governments were not 
alone; with the looming realization of the internal market and the need to 
create a secure outer border with the disappearance of inner borders, the 
Commission and Parliament began to take the issue of asylum policy more 
seriously. At Maastricht asylum policy was placed in the Third Pillar, 
formally institutionalizing the security approach the EU had been taking 
towards asylum policy. Realizing the ineffectiveness of the Treaty 
structures, the Treaty of Amsterdam laid the groundwork for what came to 
be a common EU asylum policy. 
The basis of the member states’ postwar refugee policy was the 1951 
Geneva Refugee Convention, to which all member states are party. The 
Convention defines a refugee and lists what social rights they should 
receive from states party to the convention. According to the Convention, a 
refugee is: 
A person who is outside his/her country of nationality or habitual residence; who has a well-
founded fear of persecution because of his/her race, religion, nationality … and is unable or 
unwilling to avail himself/herself of the protection of that country, or to return there, for fear of 
persecution (UNCHR). 
Daniele Joly calls this period, leading up to the 1980’s, as one of 
uncoordinated liberalism with regard to asylum policy.  The signing of the 
1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol (which extended protections to the 
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Third World), along with the European Human Rights Convention proved 
Europe was beginning to move towards a more multilateral approach 
regarding asylum policy. The humanitarian frame dominated during this 
period as immigration, providing cheap and flexible labor, was a must in 
the decades following 1945. This relaxed view spilt over into asylum 
policy, as calls for restriction both from political and social sources were 
fairly non-existent (at least outside of far-right parties). Attempts to 
coordinate policies at an exclusively inter-European level first came in 
1976 with the signing of the Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism, and 
Violence International (TREVI) act. TREVI was aimed mainly at 
controlling terrorism and never truly developed into a real institution. 
However, it did serve as something of an “education” for officials that 
would later be part of the Justice and Home Affairs Council in the Third 
Pillar, where asylum policy would lie many years later.
4 TREVI was the 
beginning of the second stage of post-war asylum policy, what Joly terms 
“harmonized restriction.” It was also TREVI that helped establish and 
sustain a transgovernmental group of social circles made up of police 
offices and civil servants of various European interior ministries. This laid 
the basis for unbothered action behind closed doors, something that will be 
discussed in detail in a later section.   
National policies across the board became more restrictive in this period.  
Changes in the labor market, as well as a desire to protect the social and 
economic rights of the domestic labor force, were the motivating factor for 
this shift.
5 Across Europe, foreign labor programs were shut down and 
asylum, now being one of the few legal means of immigrating to an EU 
country, was put under increasing scrutiny by the governments and public.
6 
In the interest of closer integration, the Council of Europe made two 
recommendations, in 1976 and 1981, to harmonize asylum policy. By the 
mid-1980s the member states began taking steps towards this goal, mostly 
out of necessity. From the outset, the goal of harmonization was not to 
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better the response to refugees and safeguard their rights; rather the goal 
was to reduce the number of refugees and asylum seekers.
7 With policies 
becoming more restrictive in some nations, asylum-seekers began moving 
to nations with more relaxed policies. The first lasting harmonization 
attempt, therefore, was a restrictive one under a realist frame. 
The mid-1980s saw a shift of asylum policy for some member states away 
from the UN and Council of Europe to an intergovernmental forum in the 
EU context. The two overlapping bodies dealing with immigration at this 
time were the Ad Hoc Group on Immigration and the Schengen Group 
(created by the Schengen Agreement).
8 Both of these groups were manned 
predominantly by members of each nation’s Interior Ministries, as they 
were the pertinent national group that had jurisdiction over immigration. 
The 1985 Schengen Agreement was an attempt to remove border controls 
within state parties. In addition to the original core group (Germany, 
France, and Benelux), every EU member state except for the UK (but in 
addition Norway and Iceland) has become party. The implementation was 
to begin in 1995 but was delayed until 1996, due to state ratifications and 
amendments to national laws. As far as asylum policy in concerned, 
Schengen laid out some detailed plans of action. External border controls 
were harmonized and strengthened, fines would be imposed on carriers 
who transported asylum seekers into the Schengen area without proper 
documentation, and the country of first asylum notion was put forward. The 
country of first asylum concept placed responsibility for an asylum seeker 
on the country that first granted entry authorization. These responsible 
states must take back asylum seekers who have entered another state 
“irregularly.” Other states may of course process the claims of an asylum 
seeker for their own “special reasons.” Responsible states needed to expel 
those not granted asylum, so as to prevent them from entering another 
 
7   Joly, Daniele et al.  Refugees in Europe: The Hostile New Agenda. UK: Minority 
Rights Group, 1997: pp. 22. 
8   Lavenx, Sandra. The Europeanisation of Refugee Policies. Burlington: Ashgate 
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state.
9 These protections were put into place so as to discourage asylum 
seekers from “asylum-shopping” to find a visa.   
The Schengen Agreement also implemented a common computerized 
system designed to exchange personal information among states (the 
Schengen Information System, or SIS), and the EURODAC, a Europe-wide 
fingerprinting system for asylum seekers. Asylum seekers granted visas 
were allowed to move freely within the Schengen Area, granted they notify 
appropriate parties within three days of their arrival. The Agreement was 
also forward-looking, as it stated that it was compatible with Community 
Law and that once an agreement on an area without internal frontiers was 
reached, it would be incorporated into it or replaced by it. The realist 
approach had to a degree become institutionalized, and the Schengen 
Agreement was accordingly criticized widely, namely by the UNHCR, for 
weakening international refugee law.  The SIS and EURODAC were also 
targets of criticism due to lack of a supranational judicial control to provide 
review. In addition to these problems, the absence of the UK, one of the 
largest receiving states in the EU, and delays causing the Agreement to be 
implemented in 1996 (after the largest flows of refugees had occurred) 
caused Schengen as a stand-alone system to be seen as rather flawed with 
regard to its asylum provisions. The Dublin Convention was an attempt to 
remedy some of these problems, and mirrored many of Schengen’s 
provisions. 
The legally binding Dublin Convention was signed on June 15, 1990 by 
eleven EC member states. This Convention was also plagued with delays, 
and only came into effect in September 1997 for the pre-1995 members of 
the EU (it later came into effect in September 1998 for Sweden, Finland, 
and Austria).
10 The main purpose of this Convention was to identify the 
member state responsible for examining an asylum claim lodged in the EU. 
The Convention was needed for several reasons. First, the problem of 
"refugees in orbit," asylum seekers passed from state to state with no one 
accepting responsibility for them, needed a concrete solution. Secondly, 
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asylum seekers needed to be prevented from filing multiple applications for 
asylum in different states, either consecutively or concurrently. The 
Convention lays out a hierarchy for determining which state is liable for 
asylum applications. The notable change to the Schengen Agreement is a 
member state that has a family member (with a refugee status) of the 
asylum seeker is forced to take responsibility for that asylum seeker’s 
claims. The Convention further defines situations that may arise due to 
illegal entry or border crossing and how claims should be handled in these 
cases.   
The Convention also outlines procedures for the transfer and return of 
asylum seekers (including information exchange) and establishes time 
limits for determining responsibility of a member state with regard to an 
asylum seeker’s claim.
11 The Dublin Convention allows for deportation of 
a failed asylum seeker to a ´”third safe country,” provided the asylum 
seeker had previously traveled through that state. In practice however, this 
state can be anything but safe. For instance, in 1992 fifteen Tamils were 
returned to India by Denmark via Finland and Poland.
12 While the system 
did finally represent an EU-wide mechanism, the lack of uniform standards 
in asylum policy creates gaps in the Dublin mechanism. An asylum seeker 
may find different conditions in his responsible state than the state he 
currently resides in. Furthermore, since most entry points within the EU are 
in the south and east, more burden is placed on poorer states that do not 
have the necessary infrastructure to deal with a large caseload. The 
incentive for these countries would be to get rid of there caseload as soon 
as possible, and this attitude can be seen clearly when noting that Italy 
expelled 185,000 asylum seekers between 1998 and 2000 compared to only 
10,000 annually in previous years. The Council attempted to remedy this 
through the creation of a European Refugee Fund in 2000 to lessen the 
burden of some member states. However, since its creation, “the lion’s 
 
11 Sorenson, Jens Magleby. The Exclusive European Citizenship: The Case for 
Refugees and Immigrants in the European Union. Brookfield: Avebury, 1996: pp.41-
42.   
12 Hayter, Teresa. Open Borders: The Case Against Immigration Controls. London: 
Pluto Press, 2000: pp. 73  The Evolution of EU Asylum Policy 
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share” of the Fund’s resources go to Germany and the UK.
13 Schengen and 
Dublin, while slow and laborious in their implementation, did establish a 
framework for dealing with asylum policy affairs on what was soon to be 
called the third pillar of the EU. While this was a positive step in the 
direction of integration, the human rights dimension of asylum again took a 
backseat to security concerns.  
III. Asylum Policy in the Treaties: A Temporary or 
Lasting Solution? 
The debate as to what to do with asylum policy took on a familiar form in 
the months before Maastricht. On the one side was the UK and Denmark, 
believing their policies to be adequate and superior to anything Brussels 
might come up with. Countries like Germany and Benelux however took a 
more calculated view on a common policy that, while potentially politically 
unpopular, could serve as a Brussels scapegoat for domestic anger. In the 
end however, the intergovernmental conference leading to the Treaty of 
Maastricht (ToM) established what was to be a more pragmatic approach 
that would re-orientate policies to improve efficiency. The conference also 
warned that a harmonization that did not define basic principles would 
proceed at the lowest level. The IGC placed asylum policy in the Third 
Pillar, Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), of the EU. It was to be regarded as 
a matter of common interest in achieving the objections of the Union and 
the Commission was to share the right of initiative with the member states 
and the European Parliament.
14 
Economic worries in the post-Cold War Europe were causing national 
retrenchment with regard to asylum policy. Furthermore, the heroic image 
of the asylum seeker fleeing persecution from Communism became 
obsolete with the fall of the USSR. This new attitude was clear in both a 
newly united Germany’s constitutional discussion over a guarantee of 
asylum and the rise of the right in France. The ToM had not done much 
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more than codify processes that had already been there before. Although 
the treaty gave the member states the opportunity to use more effective 
legal instruments, the preferred modus operandi was still intergovernmental 
cooperation when it came to asylum policy. Asylum policy was still 
intergovernmental and in control of the least asylum-friendly member state. 
Again however, forward-mindedness was present and there was hope for a 
common policy. The passerelle, or bridge, made it possible for asylum 
policy to move to the First Pillar granted the Council unanimously invokes 
such an action. It would be four years until the Council did just that. 
This patchwork of asylum policies (especially with Schengen and Dublin 
not having come into effect yet) in the EU was faced with a huge test in the 
early 1990s with the Yugoslav Wars. Essentially a wake-up call for the EU, 
the lack of an effective and coherent mechanism to regulate the influx of 
refugees made it necessary to for each member state to make ad hoc 
decisions regarding reception procedures. The initial response was anything 
but coordinated, with Austria, Germany, and Sweden granting visas, while 
the UK ordered refugees to get visas via consulates in Bosnia (which in fact 
did not exist at the time).
15 By November 1993 the EC adopted the 
“Resolution on Certain Guidelines as Regards the Admission of 
Particularly Vulnerable Groups of Persons From the Former Yugoslavia.”  
This resolution created “safe havens” organized by the UN in Bosnia to 
hold asylum seekers and created the concept of “temporary protection,” 
where an asylum seeker arriving directly into an EU state must not be able 
to return home due to threat of violence back home. Many of those who 
received temporary protection were eventually repatriated: from 1996 to 
2000 Germany alone returned 250,000 Bosnians.
16 
Another response to the influx of refugees was the Resolution on 
Manifestly Unfounded Application for Asylum of 1992. According to this 
resolution an asylum application would not be considered if it raised no 
substantive issue under the Geneva Convention, was based on a deliberate 
claim of deception, or dealt with a country that was considered “safe” 
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(according to a list) by EU member states.
17 As is clear from the Yugoslav 
crisis, although harmonization was achieved on some level with certain 
restrictions, asylum policy was essentially in the hands of the member 
states. Disparities in national asylum policy were still quite present, and  
one clear example was the differing status of de facto refugees. A de facto 
refugee is someone granted asylum without being legally recognized by the 
UN Refugee Convention, a distinction that each state makes itself. While 
Sweden and Denmark gave de facto refugees equal rights to those with 
Convention refugee status, Germany, France, and the UK recognized no 
such legal status. The UK and France, unlike Germany, did not even give 
the de facto refugees any sort of humanitarian status.
18 Even if the goals of 
asylum policy in the late 1980s and early 1990s was to coordinate asylum 
policy via intergovernmental means, the results of the attempts proved the 
institutional structure in place to be bankrupt. A firmer control over asylum 
policy was necessary, and a coordinated approach was vital. 
The Third Pillar was quickly becoming the object of widespread criticism.  
Among its major problems were the lack of judicial review and a 
democratic deficit. A combination of this intransperancy as well as the 
growth of the political weight of asylum issues led to some major reforms 
for the policy during the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997.
19  Consensus was 
clear, as evidenced by the findings of an IGC conducted in March 1995, 
that the future of immigration policy was to be based on “flexibility, opt-
outs, and the gradual accretion of the Schengen Accords and a slower 
process of communitarization.” While the overwhelming majority of EU 
states were for a common asylum policy, Denmark, the UK, and Ireland 
felt that the time was not right to communitarize this piece of their 
sovereignty. The Treaty of Amsterdam (ToA) made use of the passerelle, 
and moved asylum, refugee, and migration policy from the Third Pillar to 
the First Pillar. The Commission and European Parliament, as well as the 
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Court of Justice, were given more power over traditionally sovereign 
policy.
20 This sudden impetus to tackle the problem of asylum policy 
stemmed from the urgent need to firmly protect the movement of persons 
in the face of the upcoming monetary union. 
The other two major changes to existing asylum policy were the inclusion 
of the Schengen acquis into the EU framework and the creation of the new 
Title IV in the EC Treaty called “Visas, Asylum, Immigration, and other 
policies related to the Free Movement of Persons.” Title IV of the ToA 
dealt mostly with asylum policy, and Art. 61 and 63 (via a process detailed 
in Art. 67) set out a period of five years where the Council would have to 
adopt measures in the field of asylum and immigration, essentially a 
common asylum policy. Asylum policy is never mentioned too far away in 
the treaty from other border issues like crime and illegal immigration, and 
the treaty constantly stresses minimums. The stress on minimums, given 
the vastly different situations of the member states, is understandable. 
However, the treaty seems to treat asylum on an equal footing as other 
trans-border issues, choosing not to make too much of a distinction.   
These institutional reforms were to take place after a transitional five-year 
period from the date of ratification of the treaty, which occurred on May 1
st 
1999. However, Title IV does not apply to the UK. This is an especially 
large concern when noting that the UK in recent years has been the country 
where the most asylum applications are lodged (Table 1). The ToA 
recognizes the link between foreign policy and asylum policy.  States may 
take foreign policy issues into concern regarding asylum seekers when the 
“maintenance of law and order” or the “safeguarding of internal securing 
looks to be threatened. 
Another feature of the ToA is the provision of “emergency measures” for 
dealing with a large influx of refugees subject to qualified majority voting.  
However, flexibility clauses that enabled countries like the UK to opt-out 
of Title IV matters will not be extended to applicant states, further 
undermining uniformity in policy. Despite a slightly more humanitarian 
tone in Amsterdam, asylum policy was still treated like a security issue. 
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The strengthening of the ties between the EU and its citizens has again 
confirmed the perception of asylum seekers as outsiders.  Although moved 
to the First Pillar, asylum policy has not yet fully freed itself from the grasp 
of the Third Pillar. Areas of cooperation with asylum policy still remain 
within the confines of the Third Pillar, namely trafficking controls (a plight 
more and more common for asylum seekers).  The guarantee for states to 
consider foreign policy interest when making decisions about asylum 
seekers and the introduction of “at least the same level of protection and 
security” of Schengen further underscores the persistence of asylum policy 
as a security issue.
21 
The late 1990s influx of migrants from Iraq and its neighboring regions 
provides an excellent example of the JHA Council dealing with asylum 
issues in the Third Pillar. At a meeting in October of 1997 the JHA 
Council, in response to vastly heightened numbers of asylum seekers (the 
vast majority of which where Kurds) coming from the Iraqi region, set up a 
Multi-Disciplinary Group (MDG) to examine the issue in depth. There was 
some institutional confusion as to where the MDG would report to, as some 
of its tasks would have spilled over into the CFSP area of the Second Pillar.  
It was finally decided that the MDG would report primarily to COREPER 
and that the K4 Committee (overseeing JHA matters) and the Political 
Committee (overseeing CFSP matters) would be informed and consulted 
when necessary. The MDG came up with a EU Action Plan by January of 
the following year, and its approach seemed quite promising.  The plan 
consisted of, inter alia, analysis of the causes and origin of the influx, 
increased contacts with Turkey and the UNHCR, humanitarian aid, 
effective application of asylum procedures, prevention of asylum abuse, 
combating illegal immigration, and tackling the involvement of organized 
crime. 
While the plan looked like a fairly comprehensive approach that took into 
account humanitarian concerns and root causes, during its implementation 
it shifted into the direction of the JHA and the illegal immigration 
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dimension of the problem became the main focus. The CFSP aspect of the 
issue, the dialogue with the countries in the region regarding the Kurdish 
problem, never became a reality.
22 As the Second Pillar essentially ignored 
the issue, the plan became an exclusive activity under the Third Pillar. 
Activities then focused on keeping asylum seekers in the region and away 
from the EU. Attempts by UK Presidency and the K4 Committee to locate 
asylum seekers in Turkey (which the EU somehow considered a safe 
country despite Kurdish persecution in the east) fell through and the 
member states were faced with something they had not really considered: a 
concentration of asylum seekers within EU borders.  The main route of 
transit was through Greece to Germany or Netherlands, and the EU soon 
discovered that it would be impossible for Greece as the country of first 
entry under the Dublin Convention to handle the massive caseload of 
asylum claims. As asylum applications were handled where they were 
received, it was clear asylum procedures did need to be at least partially 
harmonized if the EU was going to have a working concerted approach to 
influxes that would not put undue stress on a single member state. 
Even as there was clearly a humanitarian basis to the Kurdish problem, 
member states still seemed to perceive this influx as a mix between some 
genuine migrant and opportunist economic migrants. The effect of the JHA 
Council’s focus on combating illegal immigration in the plan on the plight 
of genuine asylum seekers was not really taken into account, and it is 
because of the Council’s structure that this was possible. While the Asylum 
Group of the Council was busy discussing the application of the Dublin 
Convention, the Migration Group was making much more progress with 
regard to measures combating illegal immigration. The Migration Group 
was able to forward their findings to the K4 Committee much faster and 
even though the K4 Committee was to coordinate the findings of the expert 
groups, it seemed satisfied to rely mainly on the Migration Group’s 
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findings to show that at least something was being done and that the EU 
was taking an active stand.
23       
The EU also had something of a plan to handle the refugee fallout from the 
2003 Iraq war. At a March 28 2003 meeting of ministers in Veria, the EU 
pledged to aid neighboring countries in sharing the burden of the expected 
refugee influx from the war. While some countries like France allotted 
visas and even temporary work permits to Iraqi refugees, the brunt of the 
EU’s contribution was a $100 million aid package that went to build 
“hospitality centers” in Iraq and neighboring countries to house refugees. 
At this same conference, member states gave substantial support to a UK 
proposal that would establish other asylum processing centers, most likely 
in Russia and Ukraine, as a medium term solution to asylum issues. It is 
still clear that the EU is still reluctant to deal with foreigners on their own 
soil, and that the third safe country concept should be taken with a grain of 
salt if it applies to the likes of Russia, Ukraine, and Turkey. As is clear 
from the Iraqi influx, asylum’s placement in the Third Pillar over-
emphasizes its security component. However, would a move to the First 
Pillar change anything? 
A 1999 summit at Tampere laid out the objective of creating a common 
European asylum system. The first step called for was an attempt to 
achieve standards that would ensure simplicity, fairness, transparency, 
effectiveness, and speed. In the longer term, these practices would lead to 
an eventual harmonization of asylum procedure. Also noted at the time by 
the EU and various NGOs was the humanist and generous “spirit of 
Tampere.” In reality though, this spirit would not last much longer than the 
summit itself. The summit set a period of five years for a common policy to 
come into existence, during which an "area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice" would be drawn up to support the policy.  
One notable development during the period after Amsterdam was the EU 
agreeing to the Charter of Fundamental Rights at Nice in December 2000.  
Key provisions of this non-legally binding document are articles 18 (which 
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guarantees respect for the 1951 Geneva Convention, its Protocol, and the 
EC Treaty) and 19 (prohibiting collective expulsions and the upholding the 
concept of non-refoulement). Although EU leaders have now approved the 
Constitution and the attached Charter, both documents still face their 
greatest obstacles in approval throughout the member states. Even if/when 
the Charter does become legally binding, the Spanish Protocol to the Treaty 
will cause major problems in the international community. At Spanish 
insistence, a Protocol was drawn up denying the status of refugee for any 
national of a EU member state.
24 This Protocol was obviously aimed at 
Basque separatists and found its roots in a diplomatic disagreement 
between Spain and Belgium regarding a Basque seeking asylum. The 
denial of refugee status is a blatant abrogation of Article 14 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1951 Geneva Convention. 
The Charter’s inclusion, as well as asylum policy’s move into the First 
Pillar, also brings up some legal issues as to what role the ECJ will play 
with regard to asylum in the future. What was once the sole domain of 
technocrats and police will be checked from now on. The question is to 
what degree? 
Terrorism, until 9/11 and 3/11 only a phantom menace, instantly catapulted 
to the forefront of policy concerns during this period. Naturally, asylum 
policy was going to be part of the fallout. The EU Action Plan to Fight 
Terrorism, drawn up shortly after 9-11, called for, among other things, 
improvements to the Schengen information systems. A November 2001 
Commission paper on illegal immigration called for an eradication of 
“human smuggling and trafficking regardless of the fact that legitimate 
refugees use these same channels.”
25 Several member states have also 
expanded their powers to enforce security, including the ability to make 
more frequent use of detention. The fingerprinting of asylum seekers via 
EURODAC throughout Europe is now a reality after many years of 
discussions. Overall however, the European reaction to 9-11 has not been 
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as unilateral and sharp as was predicted soon after the attacks.
26 However, 
the immigration-related measures of the Action Plan are probably still 
much more developed than portions of the Action Plan that deal with CFSP 
matters.   
Europe took another, harder look at terrorism after tragic events on its own 
soil. Nearly a week after the Madrid bombings member state governments 
and the Commission gave their blessing to a draft proposal entitled 
“Declaration on the Struggle against Terror.” The proposal includes a host 
of restrictive measures such as a future requirement that foreigners wanting 
to stay in the EU must have papers containing biometric data. Also called 
for was increase of border controls and cooperation between member states 
and third countries. It is too early however to gauge the real fallout from 
Madrid and even 9-11. When combining the salience of the attacks with the 
recent rise of the right however, it may be safe to say that dangers from 
terrorism may only add fuel to the restrictive fire. This time the need for 
restriction may be genuine though. 
During this time, the Commission had a very important role in the process 
of harmonizing asylum policy. In addition to issuing “scoreboards” bi-
annually to cite the progress being made, the Commission also put forward 
several proposals for directives in the following years, including a directive 
harmonizing conditions of reception, the process of refugee determination, 
and the definition of a convention refugee.
27 These proposals helped lay the 
basis for the work of interior ministers in the Justice and Home Affairs 
Council. These proposals, however, usually had the lowest common 
denominator in mind, as the general will in the EU leaned towards a tighter 
control on migration. After all, no EU member state wanted to seem more 
accessible to migrants than another. After much deliberation and a final 
decision just two days before a self-imposed deadline, on April 29
th the 
JHA Council “reached a general approach on the amended proposal for a 
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Council Directive on minimum standards on procedures in Member States 
for granting and withdrawing refugee status.”  
The general approach ensures EU-wide minimum standards, and 
constitutes the first phase towards an eventual common asylum policy. 
There will be procedural guarantees for applicants, including access to 
legal assistance and opportunities to be interviewed. Minimum 
requirements will be put into place concerning those involved in the 
application decision-making process. Also, the right to a remedy before a 
court or tribunal will be guaranteed for those who have received negative 
decisions. The general approach also reaffirms several of the concepts that 
the EU has previously adopted with regard to asylum seekers. The safe 
third country approach shall now be a standard across the EU. Essentially, 
an asylum seeker may be deported to a third country deemed “safe.” Also 
put forward is the safe country of origin concept. A EU list of third safe 
countries will be introduced, and applications of nationals from those 
countries shall be considered illegitimate. There will also be provision 
allowing a member state not to examine an application and send an asylum 
seeker to a previously traveled to “supersafe” third country.
28 
The Commission also proposed extending the European Refugee Fund 
program until 2010. The Commission also called for an increased 
integration of immigration questions into political dialogues with several 
countries of refugee origin. The dialogue is to focus on illegal migration 
and includes common readmission agreements. Several agreements are 
already in the process of being negotiated with countries like China, 
Russia, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan.
29 Finally, asylum seekers who are fleeing 
non-state persecution (like women facing female genital mutilation who are 
not covered by the Geneva convention) will be eligible to apply for 
asylum.
30 
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The Commission has more recently, in a paper entitled “A More Efficient 
Common European Asylum System: The Single Procedure as the Next 
Step,” proposed a new method to better progress to a fully harmonized 
asylum policy. The Commission will launch a Prepatory Phase that will 
monitor and assess the implementation of the first phase and identify areas 
that are appropriate for legislative action.
31 
Even after a cursory examination of the new general approach, it is easy to 
see that problematic areas still exist. The approach has already been 
denounced by several NGOs like Amnesty International, Human Rights 
Watch, and the European Council on Refugees and Exiles. It is clear that 
the safe country of origin concept will provide fewer safeguards to asylum 
seekers based solely on their country of origin. The safe third country 
concept shifts much of the responsibility that the EU might have had onto 
third countries, regardless of any links an asylum seeker might have to that 
country. The right of an asylum seeker to remain in a country until a final 
decision is reached on their application is also missing from the approach.
32 
This latest attempt at harmonization may lead to some improvements that 
seem outside of security concerns. The eligibility of asylum seekers outside 
of the convention and the fact that at least minimums are ensured in 
(nearly) all the EU 25, especially with regard to legal aid. However, these 
benefits are undercut by the introduction of concepts like “safe countries.”  
These concepts will legitimize practices that have the effect of 
circumventing “a hearing on the substance of an application in favour of an 
expedited process or administrative dismissal.”
33 Asylum-shopping may 
diminish, but those who are recognized as convention refugees and those 
who are removed will also surely decrease. Monitoring by the Commission 
is certainly a plus, but restriction is still the theme, and limiting the influx 
of third country nationals remains the focus of the now partially 
harmonized asylum policy.  
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IV. The Forces Behind The Securitization of EU Asylum 
Policy 
The free movement of persons ensured by the SEA caused issues and 
concerns related to the abolishment of internal borders to spill over into 
issues of asylum and third country immigration. The most important group 
dealing with this spillover were the Interior Ministries of each member 
state. Interior Ministers in not only France and Germany but all across the 
EU managed to keep a large degree of control over these issues and at the 
very least delay the Europeanization of their competences. Keeping the 
issue an intergovernmental one while at the same time espousing the 
rhetoric of integration was a brilliant way of controlling and gaining 
support for restrictive asylum policies. The ministers did not exist in a 
vaccum however, developments in the national politics of the time were 
also a large influence. An increasingly concerned citizenry of the 
floundering welfare state began to fear the economic repercussions of the 
entrance of economic migrants in disguise. How asylum policy was framed 
the way it was is also of interest.  Asylum was linked to border problems, 
which were historically overseen by technocrats. Also, a drive to create 
common asylum procedures only came up as an outgrowth to problems 
brought up by the Single European Act and the abolition of internal 
borders. The problem has since the beginning been handled by technocrats 
who have transposed their views onto “European views” and in a sense 
heightened the security dimension of asylum, whether it was intentional or 
not. 
The core Schengen group, having something of an “expertise” on asylum 
matters, was able to take control of the EU-wide Ad Hoc Group on 
Immigration and push their views on countries that had not had problems 
with immigration or asylum. The fact that the majority of those in charge in 
these early days were from Interior Ministries is also very important. As 
their jobs dealt with the border-crossing aspect of asylum, their approach to 
the problem was primarily concerned with the fact that asylum seekers are 
coming into their countries. Questions as to why they had come were not of 
issue; asylum problems remained a technical issue that soon became The Evolution of EU Asylum Policy 
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bundled together (and then linked directly) with crime and terrorism. The 
humanitarian dimension of the problem was not the technocrat’s concern.
34   
Some have even taken a more conspiratorial view, claiming that national 
policy-makers, in an attempt to bypass the “human rights bias” of their 
constitutions and constitutional courts have turned to the EU as an ideal 
forum for free action. As these EU forums are in essence insulated from 
activists, lawyers, and even national courts, they provide a perfect platform 
to launch “a European Realpolitik that is designed to enhance the protective 
territorial powers of nation-states.”
35 While the situation is not as extreme 
as is suggested, there is at least truth in the fact that working through EU 
forums allows one to bypass many standard national checks. As mentioned 
before though, the majority of the European public tends to be in full 
agreement with increasing restrictions.  
The perception of asylum seekers being not any better than other economic 
and illegal migrants, while over exaggerated much of time, does have a 
basis in reality. The restrictive immigration measures the EU has taken in 
the past decade has put migrants of all kinds into a difficult position. With 
tougher immigration controls in place across the EU, large numbers of 
potential migrants are pressured into seeking alternative channels of entry: 
illegal entry or asylum channels. Genuine asylum seekers themselves, faced 
with diminishing prospects of being granted asylum, have also been 
increasingly turning to traffickers and smugglers. Not only does this help 
fuel transnational criminal networks, but it also pushes asylum seekers into 
the “margins of social and economic life [in a member state].”
36 An 
incident in the UK in June 2000 where the bodies of 58 illegal immigrants 
were found in a truck underlines the dangers that a need to rely on criminal 
elements poses. 
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Despite these grim realities, public opinion throughout the EU tends to 
focus on the negative. A 1992 Dutch poll where 61% felt that Netherlands 
should maintain a flexible admission policy towards asylum seekers. A 
weakening economy and an influx of Tamil refugees was quick to change 
that opinion. A 1998 Dutch poll found that 74% felt that the entry of 
immigrants and asylum seekers is an unfortunate development and a 2000 
poll in France showed that 59% of those surveyed agreed that there were 
too many foreigners in France. Support for asylum seekers can of course 
rise and fall due to external circumstances, but overall asylum policy has 
become the subject “of the politics of representation and manipulation.”
37 
Asylum seekers can be portrayed by some stakeholders as victims and by 
other as opportunists and frauds. The question that we are then faced with 
is whether actors in the political process will choose to follow or to lead 
public opinion. Experience has shown us that some of these actors, political 
parties, have tended to follow. 
2002 election results in countries like Denmark, Italy, France, and the 
Netherlands indicate in some measure a growing public hostility towards 
asylum seekers and economic migrants. Increased seats for the anti-
immigration Danish populist party ensured that a tough new immigration 
law was passed that already saw asylum numbers drop from 3,033 in the 
beginning of 2001 to 1,877 the following year.
38  Other anti-immigration 
parties like the Northern League (Italy), Pim Fortyn's List (Netherlands), 
the Freedom Party (Austria), and the National Front (France) showed 
increased numbers (most notably in local elections) and have even 
participated in national coalitions.
39 An examination of daily newspaper 
coverage and far-right results in state elections in Germany found that 
between 1986 and 1997 asylum issues could “well account for far-right 
successes.”
40 The specter of increased far-right support does not bode well 
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for those hoping to see a humanitarian shift with regard to asylum policy in 
the near future. 
And it’s not just far-right parties who are involved, if comments from 
several French presidents are of any indication. Jacques Chirac claimed that 
the “noise and smell” (le bruit et l'odeur) of Africans would annoy their 
French neighbors, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing’s suggested that we might be 
witnessing a shift from immigration to invasion, and Francois Mitterand 
claimed that all countries have a certain threshold of tolerance (seuil de 
tolérance) when it comes to the number of foreigners in their midst.
41 The 
fact that these comments can be made by mainstream figures begs the 
question: has Europe reached it’s threshold? And if it has, what does it 
mean for legitimate migrants like asylum seekers? The rise of these parties, 
who capitalize on economic fears to push xenophobic and sometimes racist 
agendas, only underscores to need for the EU to take a proactive stance and 
break down this security image it helped create. These parties tend to frame 
the asylum and immigration problem as an economic one. However, these 
migrants are not necessarily the problem, and they may even be a solution. 
As Europe’s openness to migration had first been spurred by economic 
concerns, it comes as a great surprise then that Europe continues to shun 
cheap labor during the current economic stagnation and amid grim 
forecasts for the state of welfare provisions in the coming decades. The 
structure of the welfare systems in most European countries have led to a 
situation where for many it pays more to stay unemployed. Economically 
then, there is a market demand for cheap labor. After all, migration is first 
and foremost prompted by labor-market considerations. When an economic 
or any other migrant knows prospects in the job market are poor, he would 
be less likely to migrate. And as can be seen, asylum seekers have been 
able to fill this demand out nicely in countries like Denmark and Sweden, 
where they have been quickly incorporated in large numbers into the 
service industries.
42   
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In light of recent economic troubles, welfare provisions are becoming 
increasingly scarce. Asylum seekers are seen as illegitimate challenges to 
the limited supply of these rights, and Europeanization has supported these 
notions. For instance, a JHA Council meeting in 1994 concluded that a 
foreigner would have access to employment only when “vacancies in a 
member state cannot be filled by a national and Community manpower or 
by non-Community manpower lawfully resident on a permanent basis.”
43 
Shrinking resources necessitate the distribution of welfare benefits to 
rightful members of society first, as people tend to want to feed their poor 
before they feed others. Despite the anger over the burden these asylum 
seekers place on welfare systems, minimal support tends to be the case in 
most European countries. The trend has been to keep asylum seekers out of 
the regular social security system through providing benefits in kind (like 
food stamps) and reduce their overall entitlements.
44 Furthermore, with 
Europeans retiring earlier payments into the system are decreasing and 
increased cheap labor is most likely one of the only answers to this 
problem. Europe does realize that migration is necessary to some extent, 
however when placed within the broader context of security the realization 
of the need will be hindered.    
There is another dimension to the perception of asylum seekers as a 
security threat in Europe. One image that has been quite visible in media 
during the past decade has been the growing xenophobia and racism in 
Europe. Acts of violence towards foreigners make no distinction between 
illegal and legal migrant, and what is at stake here is not just individual 
security, but group security. As Schengen and Dublin grouped together 
asylum seekers with the hunt for criminals, drug cartels, and terrorists it is 
no surprise that the public is not quick to make a distinction.   
The concept of societal security is a useful tool for examining the feelings 
of some segments of the European public. Society in this case refers to 
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cultural identity, something to be distinguished from the sovereign state.  
Society is separate from state, and the mass influx of foreigners can 
threaten society without necessarily damaging the state. This dynamic can 
be explored better with an understanding of a Hobbesian model of security, 
where everyone is against everyone. A sphere of trust (us) is separated 
from a sphere of fear (them) because fear is the basis of external relations 
while trust is the basis of internal relations.
45   
The europeanization of asylum policy has become a political issue, where 
the criteria of belonging in the EU become contested. Many Europeans 
cling onto the notion that cultural homogeneity still exists, and at the same 
time there can be no doubt that most European countries have become 
countries of immigration. Many conservative groups have framed all 
immigrants (including asylum seekers) as a threat to that identity. The 
media aids these groups, frequently painting a picture of immigrants as a 
threat. This cultural threat is even put up against nationalism, the most 
notable traditional instrument of societal and political integration and 
harmony. And it is the migrant, and by extension asylum seeker, who is 
destroying this harmony.   
If the migrant cannot share in the pervading cultural identity, he becomes 
useless to the majority. And since all migrants cannot be part of this 
identity, they are essentially the same. Generalizations made about 
minorities underscore the idea that these foreigners are out of place here 
and should leave. This kind of kind is clear, even in a physical sense, when 
looking at the Danish reception centers for Bosnians. Bosnian refugees, 
kept far away from the rest of the population in housing, were taught in 
Bosnian at school and were essentially excluded from Danish society. 
Integration is certainly a distant possibility when physical and language 
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barriers are enforced, giving refugees no recourse but to separate 
themselves. 
Unfortunately, as security measures tend to become self-sustaining, there 
might not be an end to these problems anytime soon. Security measures 
taken by the “natives” will most likely be countered by measures taken by 
the migrants. These measures will then be taken as further proof by the 
“natives” of the danger migrants pose. This circular process is known as a 
“security dilemma.”
46 It is not easy to change attitudes and “tradition” 
throughout Europe. When the people support something, in a representative 
democracy it usually is not long before their desires get attention. And so it 
is understandable that the EU is continuing its restrictive stance towards 
asylum. However the EU has and will be an important democratic and 
humanitarian force, a civilian power. It should set examples throughout the 
world, and building walls around itself is not a step in the right direction.  
People may eventually become acclimated to rising numbers of migrants, it 
just takes time and effort from both the national governments and the EU to 
better integrate these “outsiders.” The solution may not be easy, but not 
treating asylum seekers as a security threat is a good first step.        
V. Enlargement and Asylum Policy Transfer 
Many view enlargement as an example of the EU reassering the liberal 
values that underpin it. The image of the EU15 helping its long held back 
Eastern neighbors into prosperity is appealing, and is true to a great degree. 
However, with enlargement, Europe was given the opportunity to transfer 
many of their stances on certain policies onto the Accession Countries (AC, 
will be referred to as such for simplicity’s sake despite their new status).  In 
the case of asylum policy, Europe was able to plug up several “holes” in its 
borders and keep third country nationals further away from its original 
borders. Due to the lack of liberal traditions in many of the AC, both the 
humanitarian frame and realist frame had to be used to some degree with 
regard to policy transfer. It was however the realist frame that played the 
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leading role in the process of policy transfer to the AC. This was 
unavoidable mainly due to the dominance of intergovernmental structures 
dealing with the transfer of this policy in place and the dominance of the 
JHA in these.
47 
The fall of the Iron Curtain and the beginning of the restrictive trend in 
migration control in Europe began around the same time, and this is 
precisely when border cooperation began between Europe and the AC. In 
order to avoid a massive influx of immigration to the West, the member 
states adopted a preventative strategy of incorporation of the AC at the 
(soon) JHA level. This approach later became formalized into the accession 
agreements and enlargement politics overall. The EU asylum acquis differs 
(from its application to regular EU countries) in its application to the AC in 
that it is no longer based on the assumption that compatible legal and social 
standards of protection exist in the AC and that the acquis was unilaterally 
imposed.
48 Three major constellations grew out of cooperation: German 
together with Poland and the Czech Republic, Austria with Hungary, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia, and Scandinavia and the Baltic states.
49  
The safe-third country rule was applied to the AC and readmission 
agreements were signed between the EU15 and the AC. This was followed 
by several wide-ranging bilateral agreements between the national security 
agencies responsible for policing Eastern borders and the creation of a 
more effective infrastructure to better combat illegal immigration. This 
cooperation, since 1991, came under the heading of the Budapest Group, 
which consisted of representatives of the Interior Ministries of all the 
countries involved. Activities mainly included strengthening borders 
through improved technology, training of border guards and police, 
creation of information and communication systems, and changes to 
criminal law pertinent to border-crossing in the AC.
50 
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While many of the AC were designated as safe third countries in the early 
1990s, they were in fact anything but safe. As they lacked the social, legal, 
and administrative traditions that much of the EU15 had, there was doubt 
that these countries had the capacity and ability to treat asylum seekers in a 
way in that could be considered safe. As the cooperation was occurring 
under the supervision of JHA officials however, emphasis on ensuring such 
capacities was not quite there. For example, of the 120 million DM given to 
Poland by Germany in the cooperation framework less than 1% was given 
to the Polish Refugee Office, and even some of that was invested in 
strengthening expulsion capabilities.
51 The vast majority of aid money then 
was invested in increasing border security and training personnel. 
As cooperation on asylum policy progressed on the European level in the 
following years, it soon became necessary for it to be involved somehow in 
the EU’s strategy of pre-accession. JHA matters were introduced into the 
pre-accession strategy only in December 1994, after much deliberation as 
to how far the scope of the acquis would reach and what the AC would 
have to do in order to be part of the EU. The Commission felt that the 
cooperation that had been occurring thus far focused too much crime and 
too little on asylum. There also was the question as to whether the AC 
should have to take part in agreements under the Third Pillar that some 
member states were not part of or were not binding, as was the case with 
several parts of the European asylum acquis at that time. Between 1994 and 
1997 meetings focused on tightening visa requirements, better reinforcing 
border controls, and intensifying the use of readmission agreements.
52   
The Commission finally decided in 1997 to include an “extensive list of all 
instruments adopted by the EU member states and the Schengen Group 
before and after the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty” in 
negotiations.
53 In addition to formal conventions, the AC would also have 
to adopt informal and non-binding measures, including draft instruments 
that are still in negotiation. In a sense, the movement of asylum to the First 
Pillar and the incorporation of Schengen at Amsterdam also gave the EU a 
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legitimate reason to compel the AC to adopt an asylum acquis that current 
members could opt out of and that had parts which did not even exist. And 
it was only in 1997 that the JHA meetings actually discussed asylum as part 
of its cooperation with the AC, and this discussion was only general and 
was concerned mostly with hopes of applying the Dublin Convention in the 
AC. 
The summer of 1997, the creation of accession partnerships marked a new 
chapter in EU-AC relations. The main focus of JHA at the time was the 
implementation of the Schengen acquis, and a 1998 EU Ministers of the 
Interior saw the AC agree to implement the acquis before their accession.  
In order to aid the AC in their efforts, the EU and AC signed a “Pre-
Accession Pact against Organized Crime” which focused, surprisingly, on 
security aspects.  PHARE funding was also extended to these matters, 
under the banner of the “Phare Horizontal Programme on Asylum” (PHA). 
Unfortunately, the funds were primarily used to strengthen border controls 
and were only to apply to the establishment of asylum systems in the 
medium term.
54 The PHA allowed for Twinning projects between asylum 
agencies in the East and West, and gave the member states another avenue 
of direct influence on AC asylum policy.
55 A peculiar characteristic of the 
screening of the progress of JHA matters throughout this period is that 
COREPER oversaw the process instead of by the Commission (who is 
competent to evaluate all other accession preparations). Oversight by 
COREPER allowed the member states to ensure their control without 
involvement from the Commission, and better facilitated a realist 
framework during negotiations. 
While asylum has been a concern of Western Europe for some time, it has 
increasingly become a problem and concern for the AC as well.  The AC 
have in general opposed the wholesale transfer of Western immigration 
policy in the fear of becoming a buffer zone for migrants.
56 While countries 
such as Germany stay protected, these relatively poorer countries needed to 
bear the brunt of migration and bear responsibility for those within their 
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borders. The Parliament and Forward Studies Unit of the Commission both 
felt that Schengen risked becoming an imposed system that benefited the 
existing members in favor of the AC, however their voices were not taken 
into consideration.  
The AC policy towards asylum and immigration soon changed across the 
board. Considering all of the challenges faced by the AC during this period, 
it was understandable that asylum policy was given a rather low priority.  
Despite priorities, the early 1990s saw the implementation of the Geneva 
Convention and liberal asylum regimes in most of the AC (by 1997 all 
were party). This was of course followed, due to cooperation with JHA 
ministers, by a string of increasingly restrictive reforms through the 
following decade. While domestic situations where important in the 
beginning of asylum policy creation in the AC, the influence of the EU and 
the member states increased exponentially over the 1990s. This influence 
led to a convergence of the core elements of the EU asylum acquis in the 
AC asylum policies without any regard to differences in asylum flows in 
the AC.
57 Changes were not always restrictive though, at least initially. For 
instance, Bulgaria grudgingly adopted the Geneva Convention in 1992 
because of EU pressures.
58 Overall though, wholesale changes in asylum 
law were brought about by EU concerns in AC. A new Bulgarian asylum 
law that took effect in 1999 was created based on criticisms from the EU, 
many of them asking for restrictive measures.   
By forcing the AC to take on their asylum mantle, the EU put the AC into a 
rather difficult situation. Expecting adequate protection of refugees and 
Western standards of human rights may not be fair to countries that lack 
such liberal tradition and still are fairly new to democracy and all that it 
entails. At the same time the EU has (or rather JHA officials have) tended 
to emphasize security concerns more, something that the AC tend to be 
more familiar with in the first place. Furthermore, the transformation of the 
AC from countries of origin to countries of destination (due to their 
geographic position) will be a difficult and expensive one, and the EU has 
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given them little assistance outside of border control and security.
59 
Looking at Table 2, the large increase in recent years of asylum 
applications lodged in Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia is 
particularly striking. A series of Eurocentric concentric circles (from 
Eastern Europe as far as Turkey and Morocco) could surround the EU, 
pushing others further and further outside of Western Europe.
60 The 
creation and emphasis on the strict security of the new EU’s borders has 
also threatened the extinction of close historical, cultural, and economic 
ties in the East. Entering countries that the AC previously had simplified 
border procedures with now will requiere visas. Despite whatever 
economic gains will be made for the AC, there will be losses. For example, 
the previously close economic ties between Poland and Ukraine have 
slowly become undone. Between 1997 and 1999 there has been a 50% 
decrease in cross-border traffic and a 10-14% jump in unemployment along 
Poland’s south and east border.
61 The movement of ethnic minorities like 
the Hungarians present in Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Serbia, and 
Ukraine will most likely also prove a problem in years to come.
62 
Tracing the development of asylum policy in the AC and the influence of 
the EU and its member states, one can conclude that the adoption of asylum 
policy in the AC was induced primarily by the neighboring EU member 
states. Through financial and technical aid, member states built up the AC 
border infrastructure with an eye to better protect themselves illegal 
migrants entering their territory via the AC. The Commission has mostly 
played a marginal role in the process of asylum policy transfer to the AC. 
After the decision to include JHA in the pre-accession strategy in 1994, it 
only began to play a role with regard to annual screening procedures that 
charted the AC’s progress. The Commission probably had its greatest effect 
via the PHA funds, however the organization taking the lead with the use 
of the funds was a German federal office. The most influence then came 
from the neighboring member states. Enlargement means both exclusion 
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and inclusion for the AC. AC citizens will soon be able to have complete 
freedom throughout the EU, but this freedom has come at a price to their 
Eastern neighbors and historical allies. The price that those outside of the 
new Europe will have to pay will be enormous: visa costs, and limits on 
trade and movement.
63 How things work out in the end is still anyone’s 
guess as the AC have only just recently become full members and bilateral 
agreements still constrain free movement throughout the new EU for the 
next few years. Even though the EU has come up with a harmonized 
approach, it is difficult to see how it will be completely fair to the AC. 
There may indeed begin to form concentric circles around the EU, keeping 
foreigners further away from the West through the new Eastern buffer 
zone. 
VI. Conclusions and Recommendations 
The tension between upholding human rights and preserving sovereignty is 
the vital issue when looking at European asylum policy. Europe has tended 
to favor the upholding of member state sovereignty in the past decades in 
light of the fact that immigration is still a very sensitive topic. At the same 
time, the recent Cap Anamur incident, where a German aid ship containing 
37 African refugees had to stay at sea for nearly three weeks before getting 
permission from Italy to dock in a Sicilian harbor, is giving new salience to 
the already pressing asylum issue. European responses thus far have been 
“business as usual” however, with German interior minister Otto Schily 
supporting plans to establish such a center in Africa where Africans could 
apply for asylum without entering the EU first.
64 
Now that the first phase of a common asylum policy is finally in place, 
what challenges lie ahead? For starters, minimums have only been ensured 
thus far. What needs to be part of phase two? Of paramount importance is 
establishing a concept of common admission for economic purposes to 
each member state. The right of a member state to determine the number of 
 
63 Favell: pp. 596. 
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third country nationals admitted to their territory for the purpose of 
employment has been confirmed by the Treaty. However, the need of 
efficiency and fairness dictate some progress being made in this vital area. 
Instead of focusing on managing these asylum seekers, perhaps a broader 
strategy that involves getting rid of the problem at its source would be more 
effective. Europe can continue to react when influxes from Yugoslavia, 
Iraq, or (more presently) Sudan occur, or they can engage these regions and 
help stop the flow of asylum seekers in the first place. Ideas like these are 
not new, as can be seen in the original Action Plan dealing with Iraq. 
However these ideas need to be translated into reality, with CFSP matters 
taking an increased role in areas of concern to prevent asylum influxes 
before they begin. Regional cooperation until now has mostly focused on 
creating centers away from Europe for asylum seekers to await the results 
of the application. Of course, issues regarding CFSP and its efficacy merit 
another paper of its own, but at least attempting to make more of an effort 
is a start. 
A EU-wide single procedure for examining asylum applications would also 
greatly enhance efficiency and get rid of undue delay in the processing of 
applications. The Commission is currently in the process of examining 
ways to create a single procedure where all possible reasons for seeking 
asylum are examined at one time. This would of course go a long way in 
combating asylum-shopping in Europe, a practice not beneficial to either 
the member states or the reputation of legitimate asylum seekers.   
Burden-sharing can also be an important tool to help shift responsibility 
throughout Europe. While countries that do not typically receive the brunt 
of migration may vehemently oppose such plans, burden-sharing may be 
the only way to fairly and efficiently spread displaced populations by 
relieving the already too heavy burden on poorer member states. The 
reduced burdens would not only increase efficiency, it could also better fill 
up labor needs in the member states and better ensure the human rights of 
asylum seekers by making it less likely that a country like Greece would 
expel them due to overcrowding. The UNHCR has also called for the 
increased use of resettlement of refugees to other countries. Some member 
states, like Spain and the UK, have already started resettlement programs, Ashkaan Rahimi 
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and a EU-wide program could resettle tens of thousands of refugees a year. 
Increased repatriation is also another UNHCR solution. With the help of 
Western nations, refugees could be repatriated after some time safely into 
their country of origin. This would not only ease concerns in Europe, but 
also help signal the end of the problems that originally brought the asylum 
seekers to Europe in the first place. 
There is still a great deal of work to be done before asylum policy is fully 
harmonized. The humanitarian frame needs to make up some of the ground 
it has lost to the realist frame during the asylum dialogue of the past 
decades. The EU institutions have the to potential to have truly liberalizing 
effects on the current asylum acquis. The Commission, Parliament, an 
especially the ECJ through their oversight competences can take the 
initative that member states thus far have not taken. The EU has obligations 
as a civilian power and an example-setter with regard to human rights.   
Whether increased EU involvement can move the European asylum acquis 
into the right direction will not be clear for some time, but hopefully 
Europe can start setting an example in an area that it has mishandled in the 
past.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The Evolution of EU Asylum Policy 
  37
Bibliography 
Alink, Fleur, et al. “Institutional Crises and Reforms in Policy Sectors: the  
Case ofAsylum Policy in Europe.” Journal of European Public 
Policy 8.2 (2001):286-306. 
Barutciski, Michael and Suhrke, Astri. “Lessons From the Kosovo Refugee  
Crisis: Innovations in Protection and Burden-sharing.” Journal of 
Refugee Studies 14.1 (2001): 95-115. 
Brochmann, Grete and Hammar, Tomas Eds.  Mechanisms of Immigration  
 Control. New York: Berg, 1999. 
de Jong, Dennis. “Asylum in Europe: Underpinning Parameters.” Global  
  Changes in Asylum Regimes. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. 
Deutsche Welle. “Denmark Turns Chilly on Immigration.” 5 June 2004. 
Available:http://www.dw-world.de/english/0,3367,1434_A_ 
567610,00.html.” 3 June 2002. 
Deutsche Welle. “Greens Oppose EU Asylum Center.” Available: http:// 
www.dw-world.de/english/0,3367,1432_A_1272826_1_ A,00.html? 
mpb=en. 
Deutsche Welle. “Ministers Reach Breakthrough on EU Asylum Policy.” 5 
June 2004. Available: http://www.dw-world.de/english/0,3367,1430 
_A_1156465 _1_A,00.html.” 31 May 2004. 
European Commission. “Commission Communication: Area of Freedom,  
Security, and Justice: Assessment of the Tampere Programme and 
Future Orientations.”  Available: http://europa.eu.int/comm/ justice_ 
home/doc_centre/intro/docs/sec_2004_693_en.pdf. 
European Commission.  “Going beyond a first phase of harmonisation for  
asylum in the European Union.”  25 May 2004. Available: http:// 
europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/fsj/asylum/common/wai/fsj_asylu
m_common_eu_en.htm. 
European Commission. “Minimum standards for Member States' 
procedures for granting and withdrawing refugee status in the EU - 
Political agreement in Council.” 7 June 2004. Available: http:// 
europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/fsj/asylum/standards/wai/fsj_asylu
m_standards_en.htm. 
Favell, Adrian & Hansen, Randall.  “Markets Against Politics: Migration, Ashkaan Rahimi 
  38 
EU Enlargement and the Idea of Europe.” Journal of Ethnic and 
Migration Studies 28.4 (2000): 581-601.   
Gallagher, Stephen. “Towards a Common European Asylum Policy:  
Fortress Europe Redesigns the Ramparts.” International Journal 
Summer 2002 3(2002): 375-394. 
Hayter, Teresa.  Open Borders: The Case Against Immigration Controls. 
  London: Pluto Press, 2000. 
Human Rights Watch. “European Union: Asylum Proposal Violates Basic  
Rights.” 10 June 2004. Available: http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/ 
03/29/eu8233.htm. 
Huysmans, Jeff. “Migrants as a Security Problem: Dangers of 
‘Securitizing’ Societal Issues.” Migration and European Integration: 
The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion. London: Pinter 
Publishers, 1996. 
Huysmans, Jeff.  “The European Union and the Securitization of 
 Migration.”    Journal of Common Market Studies 38 (2000): 751-77. 
Joly, Daniele et al.  Refugees in Europe: The Hostile New Agenda.  UK:  
  Minority Rights Group, 1997. 
Justice and Home Affairs Council. “19 July 2004 First Annual Report on 
immigration and integration: Press Release.” 12 August 2004. 
Available:http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?referenc
e=MEMO/04/185&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLan
guage=en. 
Kantouris, Costas.  “EU seeks to limit refugee crisis.”  25 May 2004. 
Available: http://www.adn.com/24hour/world/story/831533p-586027 
8c.html.” 2003. 
Karapin, Roger. “Far-Right Parties and Construction of Immigration 
Issues.” Shadows Over Europe: The Development and Impact of the 
Extreme Right In Western Europe. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2002. 
Kjaerum, Morten. “Refugee Protection Between State Interests and Human  
Rights: Where is Europe Heading?” Human Rights Quarterly 24.2 
(2002): 513-536. 
Lavenex, Sandra. “EU Enlargement and the Challenge of Policy Transfer:  The Evolution of EU Asylum Policy 
  39
the Case Of Refugee Policy.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration 
Studies 28.4 (2002): 701-721. 
Lavenex, Sandra. “Migration and the EU’s New Eastern Border: Between  
Realism And Liberalism.” Journal of European Public Policy 8.1 
(2001): 24-42. 
Lavenex, Sandra.  The Europeanisation of Refugee Policies.  Burlington:  
 Ashgate  Publishing  Company, 2001. (2001a) 
Levy, Carl and Bloch, Alice Eds. Refugees, Citizenship and Social Policy  
 in  Europe. New York: Macmillan Press, 1999. 
Loescher, Gil & Milner, James. “The Missing Link: the Need for  
Comprehensive Engagement in Regions of Refugee Origin.” 
International Affairs 79.3 (2003): 595-617. 
Minderhoud, Paul E. “Asylum Seekers and Access to Social Security:  
Recent Developments in the Netherlands, United Kingdom, 
Germany, and Belgium.” Refugees, Citizens, and Social Policy in 
Europe. Great Britain: Macmillan Press, 1994. 
Rosello, Mireille. “Fortress Europe and its Metaphors: Immigration and the 
Law.” 12 August 2004. Available: http://uw-madison-ces.org/papers/ 
rosello.pdf. 
Papademetriou, Demetrios G.  Coming Together or Pulling Apart?   
Washington,DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996. 
Schuster, Liza. “Political Asylum in Germany and Britain.” Migration and  
  Mobility:The European Context. London: Anthony Rowe, 2001. 
Sorenson, Jens Magleby.  The Exclusive European Citizenship: The Case  
for Refugees and Immigrants in the European Union.  Brookfield: 
Avebury, 1996.   
UNHCR.  “Asylum Applications Submitted in the European Union: 1991- 
2001.” 25 May 2004. Available: http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/ 
vtx/home/opendoc.pdf?tbl=STATISTICS&id=3d075f4a4&page=stat
istics. 
UNHCR.  “The 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention.”  2001.  Available:  
 http://www.unhcr.ch/1951convention/51qanda.html. 
 
 Ashkaan Rahimi 
  40 
Tables 
       Table 1: EU Refugee Applications 1992-2003      
                
  1992  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Rank
Austria  16240  4750  5080  5920  6990  6720  13810 20100 18280 30140 37074 32340 6 
Belgium  17650  26880 14350 11420 12430 11790 21970 36780 42690 24550 18805 16940 10 
Denmark  13880  14350  6650 5100 5890 5090 9370 12330  12200  12400  5947 4560 15 
Finland  3630  2020 840  850  710  970  1270 3110 3170 1650 3443 1650 22 
France  28870  27560 25960 20420 17410 21420 22380 30910 38750 47290 50798 51360 4 
Germany  438190 322610  127210 127940 116370 104350 98540 95110 78760 88290 71172 50450 3 
Greece  1850  810  1300 1310 1640 4380 2950 1530 3090 5500 5664 8180 18 
Ireland  40  90  360  420  1180 3880 4630 7720 11100  10320  11634  29860  13 
Italy  6040  1650  1790  1730  680  1860  11120 33360 15560 9620  7281  …  … 
Luxembourg  … … … 390  240  430  1710  2910  630  690  1043  1550  29 
Netherlands  20350  35400 52570 29260 22170 34440 45220 42730 43900 32580 18667 13400 9 
Portugal  690  2090  770 450 270 300 370 270 200 190 245 110 35 
Spain  11710  12620  11990  5680 4730 4980 6650 8410 7930 9490 6179 5770 17 
Sweden  84020  37580 18640 9050  5750  9660  12840 11230 16300 23520 33016 31360 7 
UK  32300  28000 42200 55000 37000 41500 58490 91200 98900 88300 110700 61050 1 
Total EU(15)  675460 516410 309710 274940 233460 251770 311420 396700 391460 384530 381623 308480 … 
Total World  897330 794180 570050 547600 468930 414050 481750 581130 570090 614140 587371 …  … 
Total A.C.'s  …  … … … … … … … … 43980  32070  37310  … 
Total EU (25)  …  … … … … … … … … 431970 408900 345790 … 
(Total World only includes Top 30 Industrialized Countries)               
(2003 Figures for Total EU excludes Italy)                   
*All  Figures  are  New  Applications  Only            
                
Source: http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdf?tbl=STATISTICS&id=403b1d7e4&page=statistics 
 
       Table 2: Asylum Applications Selected Accession Countries 1992-2002 
                  
  1992  1993  1994  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999  2000 2001  2002 
Bulgaria  …  …  …  520 300 430 830 1330  1760  1331  1755 
Czech Rep.  820  2190  1190  1410 2160 2100 4080 7290  8770 18087  8481 
Hungary  860 730 440 590  670  1110  7370  11500  7800  9554  6412 
Poland  …  820 600 840  3210  3530  3370  2960  4290  4506  5153 
Romania  800  … … …  590  1430 1240 1670  1380  2431  1151 
Slovakia  90  100  140  360 420 650 510 1310  1550  8151  9700 
Slovenia  … … … …  40  70  500  870  9240  1511  702 
Source: http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdf?tbl=STATISTICS&id=4039dccd4&page=statistics 
and Lavenex 2002 pg. 707                   
*All Figures are New Applications Only             The Evolution of EU Asylum Policy 
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Table 3: Per Capita Asylum Applicants in 2002 
  Per 1,000 inhabitants in 2002
Austria 4.6 
Sweden 3.7 
Ireland 3.1 
Luxembourg 2.4 
UK 1.9 
Belgium 1.8 
Netherlands 1.2 
Denmark 1.1 
Germany 0.9 
France 0.9 
Finland 0.7 
Greece 0.5 
Spain 0.2 
Italy 0.1 
Portugal 0 
(Source: http://www.ecre.org/statistics/stats%20for%20Thess%20summit.pdf 
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